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ABSTRACT
How much changed regarding the wage-employment relationship in
Britain between 1979 and 1994, as the government tried to encourage
greater wage and employment flexibility?  This paper uses settlement
group wage contract data to track the evolution of nominal wage
settlements over time and examines the impact that inflation has on
these outcomes.  We show that disaggregated wage determination is
consistent with a continuing disdain for nominal wage cuts on the part
of both employees and employers.  Paradoxically, price inflation,
rather than institutional reform of the labour market may have done
more to promote real wage adjustment across establishments in Britain.
During periods of high inflation, the distribution of manufacturing real
wage settlements shifts to the left, resulting in an increase in the
number of settlement groups who experience real wage cuts.  High
levels of inflation appear to be associated with lower real wage
increases for a given shock.  The correlation between real wages and
subsequent employment adjustment appears to be very weak. 
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THE PRICE IS RIGHT:  INFLATION AND
NOMINAL WAGE ADJUSTMENT IN BRITAIN
Donna Brown, Peter Ingram and Jonathan Wadsworth
“Any individual or group of individuals, who consent to
a reduction in money wages relatively to others, will
suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is
sufficient justification for them to resist it.  On the other
hand it would be impracticable to resist every reduction
in real wages, due to a change in the purchasing-power of
money which affects all workers alike; and in fact
reductions in real wages arising in this way are not, as a
rule, resisted.” (Keynes 1936, p.14.)
1. INTRODUCTION
Do the institutions of the labour market and role of British industrial
relations restrict nominal wage cuts, as suggested by Keynes, or has the
government’s goal of wage flexibility been realised?  The debate over
the continued existence of nominal wage rigidity has recently been
rekindled by the contradictory findings of McLaughlin (1994) and Card
and Hyslop (1995).  Using United States data, the authors present
evidence of, respectively, substantial nominal and real wage flexibility
and nominal wage rigidity, ameliorated by higher inflation.  Given this
disagreement, we therefore attempt to provide some evidence for
Britain, on the extent of nominal wage rigidities, the role of inflation in
real wage adjustment and the response of employment to shocks at
differing real wage levels.  Our analysis is distinguished by the use of
micro contract group data from the Confederation of British Industry’s
(CBI) Pay Databank on wage settlements in the private manufacturing
sector between 1979 and 1994.
Section 2 looks at recent work in this area, whilst Section 3
discusses our data.  Although our dataset contains no evidence of
nominal wage cuts, in contrast to the situation in both the USA and
2Canada, nominal wage freezes became more common over the latter
years of our sample, rising from 8% of settlements in 1990/91 to a peak
of 20% in 1992/93.  The downward nominal wage rigidity this implies
is relaxed by the impact of inflation.  Indeed, our sample shows that
real wage cuts are fairly common.  When annual inflation was in the
range of 20%, over 90% of bargaining groups received real wage cuts,
with the proportion “losing” in real terms falling to about 50% when
inflation hovered around 10%.  Therefore, high inflation appears to
assist the process of real wage adjustment.  We examine whether
employment responses to shocks are reduced by lower real wage
settlements in Section 4.  We find little evidence in support of this
hypothesis.  The final section offers some conclusions.
2. PREVIOUS WORK IN THIS AREA
Little conclusive empirical research exists to shed light on the issue of
the formation of wage expectations and real wage determination in
Britain, (see Gregory, Lobban and Thomson, 1987, p.141-2), despite
an upsurge of interest in the issue of wage rigidity in the US.
Halfpenny and Abell (1985) addressed the role of inflation, wage
expectations, wage claims and achieved settlements from wage claims
made by five British trade unions between 1947 and 1970.
Retrospective rather than prospective inflation appeared dominant in
fashioning wage expectations.  Robinson (1987) argued that the
institutions of British industrial relations were such that one should not
expect downward nominal wage flexibility.  He found that one third of
his sample saw real wage falls between 1979 and 1984, with this
declining substantially later in the decade.  He suggested that
bargaining parties did not exhibit rational expectations insofar that their
claims failed to take into account future inflation ie: they were
“backward looking”.  
In North America, Card (1990) and Christofides and Oswald
(1992) used wage contract data to investigate real wage movements
3during the 1970s and 1980s.  Christofides and Oswald revealed that
whilst internal factors were important, real wages continued to be
affected by external influences, that is they fell in response to high and
increasing local unemployment.  Card showed how nominal
contracting provisions ensured that unexpected real wage changes were
accompanied by employment changes of the opposite direction, and
although these employment responses were immediate and one-off,
wage changes had persistent effects.  More recent work in the United
States, (Card and Hyslop, 1995), using individual household-based
survey data, found there was a strong probability of employees
receiving nominal wage cuts, and that, the proportion of employees
experiencing nominal wage rigidities was in the region of 15-20% from
the mid-1980s onwards.  Their sample suggested that nominal wage
rigidity was strongly negatively correlated with the rate of inflation, but
there was little evidence of local labour markets adjusting to shocks
more quickly when inflation was high.   
McLaughlin (1994) investigated the same issue also relying upon
individual-level data.  In contrast to Card and Hyslop, he found that
nominal and real wage cuts were common for workers who remained
with the same employer and those who changed jobs.  He argued that
nominal wage rigidity is not a significant problem in the US.  Nominal
wage cuts appear to be linked only to unanticipated rather than
anticipated inflation, which is intuitively plausible given that, in the
US, cost of living allowances do not allow for complete indexation.
Those individuals who lost out were not subject to money illusion, but
the “victims” of productivity shocks.1  McLaughlin was unable to find
any significant effects of individual characteristics upon the probability
of nominal or real wage cuts, but he did show that productivity
increases had a significant and negative effect upon the probability of
a wage cut, nominal or real. 
3.  DATA
4In this paper we address the issue of nominal wage rigidity for Britain
using settlement data taken from the CBI’s establishment-level
longitudinal employment surveys.  Focusing on settlement groups2
means that we are not concerned with differences in the distribution of
movers and stayers and the associated problems of self-selection and
measurement error typical of studies using individual data, see
McLaughlin (1994).  The CBI Pay Databank began the systematic
monitoring of wage settlements from the start of the 1979/80 pay round
in August 1979.  The data used in this paper cover the period from
1979-1994 providing a continuous series on wage outcomes, inflation
rates, regional unemployment rates and influences recorded by the
month of settlement.  The dataset contains around 17,600 observations
for the manufacturing sector, with an average of 1,100 observations
from the level of the individual settlement group present in each year.
We have information on calendar year and month of each settlement.
We aggregate this information into periods corresponding to 12
monthly “pay-rounds”, traditionally thought to begin in August of each
year.  The longitudinal nature of the data means that we can follow the
same bargaining group over time to establish whether nominal rigidity
persists. 
The nominal settlement figure used is in response to the question
“Please indicate how much the settlement will increase the earnings
of a typical employee in this group over the next 12 months.  Please
include the effect of bonus payments, merit awards etc, if made as
part of the settlement”.  Most additional earnings drift should therefore
be captured by this question.3  The responses extend to two decimal
places, though we do not pursue the issue of rounding further here.
The real value of wage settlements is calculated by deducting the rate
of retail price inflation in the month of settlement from the nominal
increase.
4. THE DISTRIBUTION AND OUTCOMES OF WAGE
SETTLEMENTS
5Figures 1 and 2 show, respectively, histograms of the nominal and real
wage settlement distributions in each year of our analysis.  A vertical
line is imposed at the annual average inflation rate on the nominal
graph and at zero on the real settlement distribution.  Several key
findings emerge from the data.  The distributions cluster around zero
real wage growth, or the inflation rate on the nominal graph, indicating
either that employees seek to secure at least the rate of inflation, or that
firms are at least willing to concede the rate of inflation, the exceptions
being the high inflation years of 1979-82.  Secondly, settlement
dispersion varies inversely with inflation.  The distributions, as
captured by the coefficient of variation, are more compressed during
years of high inflation.  Thirdly, the nominal distributions display clear
spikes at zero from 1990 onwards.4  This pattern was not observed
when inflation was at similar levels in the mid-1980s.  The coefficients
of skewness and kurtosis for the distribution of nominal wage increases
reached maxima of 2.01 and 20.95, respectively, in 1983/84 when
inflation averaged 5.1%, and attained minima of -.87 and 3.80 in
1990/91 when inflation averaged 8.4 %.  There are no reported
incidences of nominal wage cuts throughout our sample period. 
Table 1 confirms that nominal wage settlements and price
inflation exhibit a positive correlation, though nominal wage growth
does not move one for one with the inflation rate.  The probability of
observing real wage cuts varies positively with the rate of inflation, so
there is evidence of a degree of money illusion.  The rate of
unemployment5, in keeping with conventional macro-economic
interpretations, is inversely related to inflation.  The proportion of
groups who lose, that is experience a real wage cut, increased rapidly
to over 90% during the rapid slow-down in inflation between 1980 and
1982.  The incidence of nominal wage rigidity is captured by the
proportion of settlements at nominal zero.  Table 1 indicates that
nominal wage rigidities increased dramatically during the 1990s
recession.  By 1992/93, a zero increase was the modal outcome,
comprising some 19.9% of all groups.  Card and Hyslop also found
6spikes of around 20% at nominal zero in their analysis of United States
individual earnings data.  
Table 1 also suggests that unexpected inflationary hikes such as
the Lawson boom in the late 1980s proved similarly damaging to real
wage outcomes.  Conversely, in periods of low and relatively stable
inflation, like 1985-1988 (and 1991-1994), the percentage of groups
who experienced immediate real gains in wages was over 80% (60%).
The correlations between both the contemporaneous inflation rate and
the rate over the contract duration, with zero settlements, are both
clearly negative over our sample period.  The table appears to suggest
that for a given rate of inflation the extent of wage adjustment has
marginally increased.  The inflation rates, and rates of change, in 1985
and 1991 were approximately the same, but in the latter year there was
a higher incidence of both nominal wage freezes and real wage cuts.
This may, however, reflect cyclical change. 
We identify both those groups who lose out immediately, that is
their settlement increase lags the contemporaneous inflation rate, and
those groups who lose eventually, the value of their increase being
eroded before the end of the settlement.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1
compare the proportion of groups losing eventually with those losing
immediately.  Whilst the proportion who lose immediately is correlated
with the rate of inflation, the number of groups who are worse off by
the end of the contract fluctuates, as one would expect, with the
change in the rate of inflation.
Longitudinal Effects
To determine whether real wage cuts and/or nominal rigidities
persist, Tables 2a and 2b present cumulative real wage experiences,
using balanced panel samples of five and three years starting in 1979,
1984 and 1989.  The cumulative real increase column shows the
experience of the same settlement groups through time, against the
backdrop of changing inflation.  The proportion of groups whose
increases outpace inflation over the panel duration, subtracting the
cumulative inflation rate from cumulative settlement increase, is clearly
7negatively correlated with the rate of inflation.  This implies that
employers’ scope for reaction to a negative shock is more limited in
times of low inflation.  The sharp increase in unemployment during the
early 1980s also appears correlated with cumulative real wage histories.
In periods of low and stable inflation and steady unemployment rates,
cumulative real wages, on average, increase.  This may reflect returns
to rising productivity over the same period.
How closely do prices and nominal wages move together?  Table
3 gives correlations between the nominal wage increase and various
lagged and leading rates of inflation for selected years.  The
correlations are positive and significant but small.  Indeed only 2% of
our sample settle at the inflation rate in the month of the agreement and
just 18.5% settle within .5 points of the inflation rate.  Over the sample
period, wage increases are most strongly correlated with the change in
inflation over the duration of the contract.  This pattern will be
observed if, as in our dataset, settlements lag the inflation rate and
inflation falls over the contract duration.  This may suggest, contrary to
McLaughlin’s (1994) claim, that workers are subject to money illusion.
Table 4 presents simple regression coefficients of the effects of
inflation and unemployment on nominal wage settlements, using the
180 monthly observations in our sample period.  The unemployment
rate is intended to capture the effect of common exogenous shocks.
Column 1 indicates that nominal settlements equal, on average, some
64% of the inflation rate with an additional 2.4 points of “drift”.  The
inclusion of year dummies, column 3, reduces drift to 1.8 points.  So
the mean settlement becomes negative at inflation levels in excess of
10%. Column 4 indicates that a one point increase in unemployment
lowers the average settlement by half a point.  If the Keynesian tenet is
correct then real wages should fall more rapidly in response to a given
negative shock in periods of high inflation.  Column 5 therefore
includes the interaction of the unemployment and inflation terms as an
additional regressor.  In accordance with the hypothesis, the coefficient
on the interaction term is negative, real wages fall with rising
unemployment, more so in high inflation years.  A five point increase
8in inflation increases the response of real wages to unemployment by
an additional .3 points.
Capturing the Effects of Rigidities
Following Card and Hyslop (1995), we generate counterfactual
wage distributions for each year.  This enables us to depict the
difference between the expected distribution, in the absence of wage
rigidities, and the distribution which is observed, and to quantify the
proportion of employees affected by nominal wage rigidity.  The
procedure requires that we mirror the top half of the actual wage
settlement distribution, and compare this with that which is observed
for those settlements below the median increase.  If downward nominal
rigidities are present then we would anticipate a spike in the real wage
distribution at minus inflation, with a deficit in the distribution to the
left of the spike, as groups are swept up to the spike.  If menu costs are
present, preventing small wage changes, then there will be a deficit to
the right of the spike at nominal zero.  The method of creating
counterfactuals relies upon three assumptions:
(1) that in the absence of rigidities the distribution would be symmetric;
(2) that the upper half of the distribution is unaffected by rigidities; and
(3) that wage rigidities do not affect employment probabilities.
Assumption 1 may be justified by appealing to the real wage
distribution observed in 1979/80, the pay year with the highest average
inflation rate in our sample, where the incidence of zero nominal
settlements is at its lowest.  Assumption 2 is valid if the median
nominal increase is sufficiently positive.  The third assumption is
perhaps the most dubious but our employment equation estimates, to
be discussed later, show no correlation between wage increase and
employment change.6 
In theory nominal rigidities can cause workers to be both “swept
up” and “swept back” to the spike in the distribution which represents
nominal wage rigidity.  The proportion which is “swept back”
9represents those who, in the absence of rigidities, might have received
a relatively small wage increase but are, in fact, subject to nominal
wage rigidity because of prohibitively large menu costs.  Those who are
“swept up” should, according to the symmetry assumption, have had
a nominal wage cut.  The counterfactual density fc is given by 
fc = fa (p) p>= 50th percentile
fc = fa (2*50 - p) p< 50th percentile
where fa(p) is the actual density at the pth percentile. Thus the
counterfactual equals the actual density above the median and the
mirror image of the top half of the distribution for all observations
below the median.7  The proportion “swept up” is calculated by
subtracting the proportion of groups shown by the actual distribution,
Fa, to be at minus the inflation rate or below, from the proportion
which the counterfactual distribution, Fc, implies should be at minus
the inflation rate or below. 
Up = Fc (-Inflation) - Fa (-Inflation)
Similarly the fraction of observations subject to menu cost rigidity, the
proportion swept back to zero, is given by the difference in the
counterfactual and actual distributions between minus inflation and the
median
Back = { Fc (median) - (Fc (-Inflation) } - {Fa (median) - Fa (-Inflation)}
The results of the Card & Hyslop model are presented in Table 5.  The
proportions “swept up” by nominal wage rigidity in column 3 range
from zero in the high inflation years to around 4% in low inflation
years.  A simple regression of the proportion swept up on the inflation
rate gives a coefficient of -.31 and standard error of .09.  A three
percentage point fall in inflation is associated with a one point rise in
the proportion affected by downward rigidity.  Column 4 reports the
10
proportions “swept back”.  This proportion, similar in magnitude to the
downward rigidities, moves in the same direction as the estimates in
column 3, being greater in low inflation years, (regression coefficient
-.70, standard error .15).  In the high inflation years these estimates are
generally negative indicating a concentration of, rather than a dearth of,
small settlement increases.   
Impact on Employment
If nominal wage rigidity impairs the adjustment of real wages in
response to a shock, then one might expect the outcome of a shock to
fall instead on employment.  Falling real wages, due to inflation, may
alleviate the necessity of sharp employment changes in the face of a
negative shock.  To explore this hypothesis, we utilise a panel dataset
constructed by following settlement groups over time.  Groups are only
included if they appear in at least five consecutive pay rounds, giving
us a total of 546 groups. 
Table 6 presents simple correlation coefficients of settlement
increases and (logged) employment changes for the period 1979 to
19918 as a means of summarising the data and illustrating its dynamic
structure. The differenced nature of the variables can be thought of as
netting out any correlations due to fixed effects.  The correlations are
given by lag length because the unbalanced nature of the panel
generates small cell sizes if calculated by settlement year.  The
settlement autocorrelations decline monotonically with the length of
lag, then oscillate around zero after around two periods.9  The link with
past real wage settlements does not last much beyond two pay rounds.
In contrast, the employment autocorrelations are generally smaller and
their signs tend to oscillate, consistent with a low order ARMA process
with a negative autoregressive component.  This suggests the
employment adjustment process is somewhat discrete.  The cross-
correlations are generally insignificant, though the link between wages
and lagged employment is stronger than the correlation between
employment and lagged wage changes.  The sign of the correlation is
also generally positive.  Wage settlements and employment adjustments
11
move in the same direction.  This may be because we are capturing
movements in labour demand along a supply curve.
To test these findings further, Table 7 presents the results of
regressions of (log) employment changes on lagged real wage
settlements, controlling for other characteristics and unobservable fixed
effects.  The regression specification can be thought of as encompassing
a sequential bargaining model, in which employment is set conditional
on negotiated wages.  The specification incorporates potential outside
influences on the firm’s and union’s fall-back position, the regional
wage and unemployment rates.10  Our dataset does not include any
firm-level information on product prices, capital stocks or output.
Such information is only available at 2 digit level from the Census of
Production.  We therefore supplement our dataset with industry level
data on productivity, profits and valued added.  This restricts our
sample to observations appearing between 1979 and 1991.11  The
estimates use the, by now, familiar Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM
estimation techniques, employing dependent variables lagged three
periods and beyond as instruments for the endogenous variables, lagged
employment and settlement at time t.  
The results are generally poorly determined, suggesting that there
is no significant relation between lagged wage changes and current
employment changes.  So the simple link implied by theory does not
appear to hold for this dataset.  This may, of course, simply be a feature
of our dataset, averaging out firm-specific shocks which shift some
groups up the supply curve and others down.  As outlined by Machin,
Meghir and Manning (1991) it is possible to distinguish between a
labour demand, right-to-manage and efficient bargaining model, by the
implied presence of specific variables.  Significance of the union
variable would identify the right-to-manage model over the labour
demand model.  The union status shift variable is, however, only at the
margin of significance.12  Similarly, the lack of significance of the
outside wage does not support the efficient bargain model over the
right-to-manage model.13  Column 3 adds a simple shift dummy to
indicate whether a zero settlement, and the implied rigidity this may
12
cause, is associated with any differential employment behaviour.  The
results indicate not.  
Following Card (1990), column 5 replaces the lagged settlement
with end-of-contract real wages, calculated as nominal settlement
minus the inflation rate over the duration of the contract.  This allows
the inclusion of an additional instrument for the wage, namely the
unexpected price change over the duration of the settlement, which is
correlated with wages but uncorrelated with information at the time of
the agreement.  The presence of year dummies should control for any
correlation of unexpected price changes with agggregate demand
shocks.  This alternative specification, however, makes little difference
to our results.
Table 7 also gives industry-level employment equations, whose
use eradicates the problem of regressing industry-level aggregates,
profits and productivity, on individual level data.  These results suggest
that at the industry level there is no significant relation between wage
and employment change.  In both the group- and industry-level
specifications the use of a dummy variable signifying a zero nominal
settlement, capturing any differential effect for those groups receiving
the lowest level of real wages and the highest level of wage adjustment
in any one year, has no effect.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of how the price of labour adjusts under inflation is of clear
interest to those interested in the functioning of the employment
market.  The evidence from our dataset on wage settlements indicates
that substantial spikes at zero in the nominal wage distribution are
observed over time, which appear to be negatively correlated with the
rate of inflation.  In the high inflation period of the early eighties under
3% of settlement groups experienced zero nominal wage increases, yet
when inflation fell to 2% in the early 1990s, nearly 20% of settlements
were at nominal zero.  Our analysis suggests that the response of
13
settlements to an aggregate shock may be mitigated by higher inflation.
A five point rise in the inflation rate reduces the real wage by an
additional .3 points for a given unemployment shock.  However,
contrary to the prediction of the Keynesian tenet we are unable to
detect any strong correlation between real wages and subsequent
employment adjustment.  The impact of nominal wage rigidity does not
therefore appear to be very strong.
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1. McLaughlin states that the proportion losing out may be
upwardly biased due to measurement error regarding wage increases.
2. Coverage is currently around 35%, having followed the same
pattern of decline as the wider economy.  Settlement groups are only
included in the CBI survey if at least part of the annual settlement is
determined at local level.
3. The question remains the same following the detail sought in the
form ‘Notification of Pay Settlements’ as required under the
government’s counter inflation policy as set out in the White Paper,
The Attack on Inflation (Cmnd 6151, 1975).  We do not know whether
individuals within groups receive awards that differ from this average.
4. The real wage distributions display smaller spikes because
nominal zeros occur at different months of the pay year and hence at
different inflation rates.
5. The precise unemployment rate used is the local unemployment
rate weighted by the geographical location of the participating groups
in the survey.  This explains why there are slight differences between
the rates quoted and national figures.
6. Card and Hyslop (1995) allow for employment changes by
constructing counterfactuals from the right of the 0.5-a quantile of the
actual distribution, where 2a is the fraction of jobs that are assumed
lost due to nominal wage rigidities.
7. For example the 40th percentile is given the density of the 60th
percentile in the counterfactual.
8. The final two years of observations are dropped because industry
level aggregates mapped into the dataset are not available for these
years.
ENDNOTES
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9. See Ingram, Wadsworth and Brown (1997) for a detailed
discussion of settlement persistence.
10. See Alogoskoufis and Manning (1991)  for attempts to identify
different theoretical models in empirical work.
11. The aggregate industry data are based on the 1980 SIC which
spans the period 1980-92.  When matching the data are lagged by one
calendar year.
12. The union status variable is based on the initial status of the
settlement group on entry into the dataset.  No information on change
in union status is available.
13. The exclusion of year dummies does not change this result.
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TABLE 1
Characteristics of Wage Change Distribution for Manufacturing
Aggregate Data Median
Nominal
Wage
Change
Coefficient
of 
Variation
 % of
groups
with
Inflation Unemp Zero
Nominal
Increase
An
initial
real
wage
cut
An
eventual
real
wage cut
79/80 18.6 4.2 16.0 0.26 0.9 70.8 28.6
80/81 13.5 7.4 8.5 0.35 1.0 92.6 73.0
81/2 10.7 9.6 7.0 0.36 3.0 92.1 18.6
82/3 5.3 10.7 5.9 0.39 5.1 29.0 36.9
83/4 5.1 11.0 6.0 0.33 1.6 29.8 47.2
84/5 5.7 11.5 6.0 0.27 0.4 33.6 19.0
85/6 4.5 11.6 6.0 0.28 1.6 17.0 9.2
86/7 3.7 11.6 5.0 0.31 2.9 14.6 19.0
87/8 4.0 9.3 6.0 0.30 1.2 6.2 88.3
88/9 7.3 7.1 7.3 0.27 0.2 61.6 80.1
89/90 8.3 5.9 8.5 0.25 1.0 49.6 43.2
90/91 8.4 7.4 8.0 0.42 8.4 53.0 12.5
91/2 4.2 9.4 4.5 0.48 10.8 41.4 13.0
92/3 2.3 10.4 3.0 0.66 19.9 25.7 37.2
93/4 2.1 9.9 2.8 0.51 8.0 32.1 72.3
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TABLE 2a
 
Characteristics of Wage Change Distributions Over Time,
Using Five Year Panels
Year Inflation
Rate
Unemployment Median
Increase
% Zero
Nominal
Increase
Cumulative
Real
Increase
% of
Groups
Beating
Inflation
1979-83
79/80 18.8 4.2 17.0 0.00 -1.3 37.8
80/81 13.0 7.4 8.6 0.37 -6.3 16.8
81/82 10.5 9.5 7.0 2.93 -11.5 9.5
82/83 4.7 10.6 5.9 5.49 -10.7 17.2
83/84 5.0 10.8 6.0 1.83 -9.8 22.3
1984-88
84/85 5.8 11.4 6.5 0.3 0.7 66.2
85/86 4.2 11.6 6.3 0.9 2.9 88.0
86/87 3.9 11.6 5.3 3.1 4.5 88.6
87/88 3.9 9.6 5.9 0.3 7.0 91.4
88/89 7.5 7.2 7.4 0.0 7.3 88.6
1989-93
89/90 8.4 5.9 8.5 1.3 0.1 53.2
90/91 7.9 7.5 8.0 7.3 -.5 50.5
91/92 4.1 9.3 4.5 8.9 -.4 51.1
92/93 1.8 10.4 3.0 16.4 0.7 56.7
93/94 2.3 9.8 2.6 7.5 1.2 57.8
The panel sample sizes are 273, 324 and 370 respectively.
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TABLE 2b
Characteristics of Wage Change Distributions Over Time,
Using Three Year Panels
Year Inflation
Rate
Unemployment Median
Increase
% Zero
Nominal
Increase
Cumulative
Increase
% of
Groups
Beating
Inflation
1979-81
79/80 18.7 4.2 16.0 0.0 -1.8 30.9
80/81 13.1 7.4 8.8 0.5 -6.9 15.3
81/82 10.5 9.5 7.0 3.8 -12.3 8.9
1984-86
84/85 5.8 11.4 6.5 0.5 0.7 67.8
85/86 4.3 11.6 6.2 1.3 2.8  87.3
86/87 3.9 11.6 5.3 2.6 4.4 88.0
1989-91
89/90 8.6 5.8 8.7 1.2 0.2 53.4
90/91 7.7 7.5 7.3 7.2 -.3 44.7
91/92 4.1 9.4 4.1 10.5 -.2 46.3
The panel sample sizes are 418, 612 and 763 respectively.
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TABLE 3
Correlations Between Nominal Wage Increases and a
Variety of Inflation Rates
Inflation Rate 1979 1981 1985 1988 1991 1993
Contemporaneous 0.102 0.029 0.056 0.215 0.039 0.083
12 months after the
settlement
-.050 0.035 -0.047 0.183 0.128 0.096
1 month after the
settlement
0.063 -.046 -.066 0.203 -.128 0.104
2 months after the
settlement
0.063 -.049 -.074 0.208 -.140 0.106
3 months after the
settlement
0.059 -.037 -.054 0.227 -.113 0.103
1 month before the
settlement
0.058 -.010 -.059 0.221 -.061 0.060
2 months before the
settlement
0.063 -.006 -.058 0.236 -.080 0.055
3 months before the
settlement
0.057 -.021 -.049 0.228 -.078 0.055
The change in
inflation over the
duration of the
contract 
0.005 0.087 0.113 0.112 0.156 0.191
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TABLE 4
 Effects of Inflation and Unemployment on Wage Growth
Nominal  Real
Independent Variables   1   2   3   4   5
Constant  2.39
(0.16)
 2.11
(0.27)
 1.76
(0.31)
 7.07
(1.02) 
 1.77
(0.95)
Inflation at Settlement  0.64
(0.02)
 0.71
(0.02)
 0.56
(0.03)
 
Actual Inflation over contract  0.79
(0.05)
Unemployment Rate -0.51
(0.10)
 0.07
(0.08)
Unemployment * Inflation -0.06
(0.01)
Year Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adj. R2  0.846  0.695  0.918  0.934 0.878
Mean Square Error  1.226  1.726  0.896  0.802 0.719
Notes: Sample size =180.  Heteroskedastic standard errors in brackets.
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TABLE 5
The Effects of Nominal Wage Rigidity Over Time 
Year Total number
of bargaining
groups in
sample
Inflation
Rate
   % "swept
up" by
nominal wage
rigidity
% "swept
back" by
nominal wage
rigidity
Total % 
affected by
nominal wage
rigidity 
("swept up" +
"swept back")
1979/80 930 18.6  0 -7.1 -7.1
1980/81 1360 13.5 0 -2.3 -2.3
1981/82 1433 10.7  0.3 -5.0 -4.7
1982/83 1311  5.3  3.8 1.6 5.4
1983/84 1361  5.1  2.7 -6.1 -3.4
1984/85 1249  5.7  2.8  1.9  4.7
1985/86 1156  4.5  2.5  1.0 3.5
1986/87 1175  3.7  1.7 8.1 9.8
1987/88 1068  4.0  5.3 -9.5 -4.2
1988/89 997  7.3  1.7 3.5 5.2
1989/90 1104  8.3  2.3 5.5 7.8
1990/91 1067  8.4 -5.3 0.3 -5.0
1991/92 1136  4.2  2.3  6.9 9.2
1992/93 1138  2.3  3.8 5.1  8.9
1993/94 1097  2.1  3.8 -0.7  3.1
